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FROM DOCTRINE
TO NARRATIVE
AND BACK IN
THE PILGRIM'S
PROGRESS
Calvin M. Peterson

wice dudng his journey to the Celestial City (once at
r
Palace Beautiful and again at the Delectable
Movintains), Christian, of The Pi/^rim'sProgress, ascends
to higher ground and is shown the terrain he is to travel. The higher
perspective does not free Christian from having to face extreme
difficulties along the way, but it does allow him to see his obstacles
with greater understanding and determination.Similarly, readers o(The
Pi/grtm's Progress make a hermeneutic journey to a meaning-destination
by interpreting individual episodes in relation to Bunyan's general
purposes. Most studies of The Pilgrim^s Progress encounter the issue of
how to connect specific characters, locations, actions, and events with
the Christian doctrines the allegory is intended to inculcate. Connecting
them has proved more problematic than Bunyan students have
expected, however, Bunyan's beliefs are complex and occasionally
paradoxical, and even though some think of an allegory written in the
plain style as a fairly straightforward type of symbolic narrative. The
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Pi/^nm's Progress is, as Bunyan knew, figurative, suggestive, and allusive
enough to generate multiple interpretations.
Differing interpretations are a fact of life in literary studies, but
Bunyan scholarship shows that the relationship between narrative and
doctrine in Bunyan's work presents unusual challenges. Thus, recent
studies can be as much about hermeneutical limitations as about the
meaning of Tbe Pilgrim's Progress. At one extreme, Gordon Campbell
concludes that "Bunyan's doctrine has not been transported intact into
the imaginative worL" In particular, the doctrine of election, "crucial
to Bunyan's theology and to his own experience of salvation...does
not affect the Christian of The Pilgrim's Progress (257)."' By contrast,
most studies of the allegory assume that it closely reflects Bunyan's
beliefs. Michael Davies's recent study. Graceful Evading, aims to restore
the link in a particular way. Bunyan's doctrine, assures Davies, is
"accommodating and consoling"; thus. The Pilgrim's Proff-esstfichcs that
grace lightens life's burdens along the way and rewards those who
persevere to the end of the journey.^ For other readers, however, the
"graceful" link that Davies demonstrates between allegory and belief
comes at the expense of predestination, which is the doctrinal
complement of grace.' The difficulty of reaching a balanced interpreta
tion has been the focus of other critics. Thomas Luxon draws attention
to the difficulty of connecting doctrine to image in his paradoxical tide,
lateral Figures. The difficulty begins, according to Luxon, when Bunyan
reverts to literary allegory while seeing life itself as allegorical; this
approach results in what might be called double figuration, with no
grounding in something unmistakably real."* Furthermore, according to
Luxon, Bunyan harbored profound anxieties "about the potential of
language to represent the 'gospel-sense' of revelation and spiritual
experience," and these led to what Luxon calls an "anti-hermeneutics

' Gordon Campbell,"The Theology of The Pilgrim's Progress" in The Pilgrim's Proffess: Critical
and Historical Views, ed. Vincent Newey, Livetpool English Texts and Studies (LiverpooL
Liverpool University Press, 1980), 253,257.
' Michael Davies, Grac^ul Reading: Theology and Narrative inthe Works ofJohn Butgan (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2002), vit
'Galen Johnson, review of Michael Davies,GracfnlReading:Theology andNarrativein the Works
of]ohnButryan,CatrinTlnohgcal]onrnaty).\ (2004): 196-197.
Thomas R Luxon, UUral Pigcrer. Puritan Allegory and the Rjformatiou Crisis in Representation
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995).
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of experience"®—& forsakingof meaning in favor of reader experiences
that can never be equated with the words that cause them or are used
to express them. Luxon thus sees a failed ontology of life behind the
quandaries of interpretation.
In another approach to the quandaries implicit in interpreting The
Pilgrim'sProff'ess,Smart Sim traces the main challenge to the "paradoxes
inherent in Calvinism" or more generally stated, in "large-scale
contradictions in the author's own belief system." Sim's attention to
paradox, however, still renders a Bunyan who believes that "outward
behavior...ultimately reveals itself to be an unreliable sign."* In this
paper we suggest that in The Pilgim's Progress outward behavior
provides a fairly reliable sign of eternal destiny; we do so not merely to
push the other side of a paradox that Sim so thoughtfully describes,
but to reopen a key question: why is it so difficult to connect Bunyan's
doctrine to his purpose-full narrative? While scholarship has clearly
engaged the question of difficulty, we approach the issue ^fferendy by
focusing on the nature of doctrine generally and the narrative-evoking
namre of the election and predestination doctrine in particular. We
argue that the election doctrine is itself inescapably narrative and that
a narrative embodiment of the doctrine will be doubly so. T his
doubling increases the attendant openness of interpretation that the
allegory already possesses in spite of the constraints caused by the
interlacing of two narrative threads.
We will explore three causes for the ongoing challenges faced by
those who interpret Bunyan's narrative in light of his beliefs. The first
cause lies in the concept of doctrine that we employ to distinguish
principles from applications and narrative exemplifications:doctrine is
not as easily separated from temporal experience and practical
applications as the dichotomy implies. The second cause lies in the
nature of the doctrines central to Bunyan's faith, doctrines in which the
tensions we find in the narrative are already present. The third cause
derives from the others and leads to our proposition that the predesti
nation doctrine is already essentially narrative. Election therefore brings
with it the hermeneutical challenges we associate with figure and story.

' Luxon, Litem/Figures, x,130.
* Stuatt Sim, Negotiations with Paradox; Narrative Practice and Narrative Formin Bneffan and Defoe
(London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1990), 1,11.
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One of the best means of comprehending election and predestination
is to see their analogy to a literary story, in which an author calls into
being characters who experience trials and conflicts while largely
unaware of the patterns that organize their "progress" and uncertain
of the destinies to which they journey. Interpreting the election
doctrine itself is very much a "progress" or journey, with its own
difficulties and failures, toward a destination that, as with the Celestial
City, can be evoked and pointed to but only with difficulty described
or defined.

* I ^
One of the difficulties of interpreting narrative and doctrine in terms
of each other lies in the concept of doctrine. The term comes from the
Greek for teaching, and thus in its origins combines notions of both
behavior and core concepts. Many uses of doctrine in the four gospels
refer to teachings generally, whether they pertain to moral injunctions,
behavior, and duty or to principles and concepts to be believed. Jesus
accused the religious leaders of his day of teaching as doctrine the
commandments of men, thus conflating prescriptions and principles
^ark 7:7), and he promised his followers that doing God's wiU would
lead them to know his doctrine, 'Svhether it be of God, or whether I
speak of myself (John 7:17). Doctrine, then, is not just law or
principle, but teaching, and that includes guidance on how to behave.
Doing and knowing overlap considerably.
Bunyan may well have absorbed a sense of the overlaps between
doctrine and narrative from his most cherished book, the Bible.
Theology gets its bearings from declarative biblical statements
("Except a man be born again..." [John 3:3]), which can be highly
figurative, as well as from narrative and other overtly figurative and
metaphorical utterances. The process of defining and verifying beliefs
has almys been a dynamic one. Doctrines such as the trinity, grace,
and election test on networks of passages that are figurative or
narrative. In light of the biblical roots of hermeneutical dynamics,
Bunyan's practice of inserting scriptural references in the margins of
The Pilffim's Progress appears to be a strategy to fix meaning in an
environment of hermeneutic fluidity. It's as if Bunyan were tying his
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text down, just as the Lilliputians tie down a potentially unruly
Gulliver, lacing and staking incidents in The Tilgrim's Progress to mqifp
sure his meaning appears compatible with, and authorized by, the
Bible. While the citations seem to guarantee that the small details of
Christian's experience conform to revealed scripture, the nvimerous
citations are also signs of Bunyan's awareness of the volatility of
interpretation in a text that cannot itself invoke, but only gesture
toward, the authority of scripture. Far from leading to a single
meaning, the citations tend only to constrain it to a circle whose
circumference is defined by sectarian discussions of doctrine and
practice.
We don't intend to collapse entirely the distinction between
doctrine, on one hand, and practices, applications, and behavioral
implications, on the other. The distinction is valid and useful. But we
do want to argue that there is, intrinsically and necessarily, a large area
of overlap in which doctrine itself is a kind of practice. If doctrine has
clear implications for behavior and practice, dien practice is intrinsic
to doctrine, even when doctrine used to refer to articles of belief. Just
as William Gass has argued that philosophy is fiction insofar as it relies
on the imagination to conjure up concepts like "the Absolute," the
"state of nature," or "the will's escape from cause,"^ so the elaboration
of doctrine is narrative and imaginative as well. To some extent,
allegory can define doctrine. The Slough of Despond is metaphorical
in being a specific mud hole that kings have tried to mend, but it is
doctrine when Help tells Christian, "It is the descent whither the scum
and filth that attends conviction of sin doth continually run,...for still
as the sinner is awakened about his lost condition, there ariseth in his
soul many fears, and doubts, and discouraging apprehensions, which
all of them get together, and setde in this place."*
In addition, the clarifying and regulating of doctrine is itself a
practice. The emergence of a term such as doctrine occurred historically
when the need arose to differentiate bodies of belief from each other,
and thus the term doctrine and the process of articulating it are kinds of
practice inserted into history for particular reasons. Doctrine, canon

' William H Gass, Fiction and the Figuns of Life (Boston: Nonpareil, 1971), 3.
' The Pilgrim's Progress, ed. N. H. Keeble (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), 13.
References appear hereafter as Win parentheses.
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formation, creeds, and confessions are practices meant to reduce the
instabilities inherent in the beliefs that qualify one for membership in
the community of faith, regulate the inherent uncertainties and
indeterminacies within particular beliefs, and stabilize the dynamic
relation between given beliefs and lived behavior. Doctrine became an
important term just when it became necessary to blur the fact that the
rigorous use of such a concept is barely possible; it is only desirable
when it is done loosely, imaginatively, with all the traces of living
experience intact'
Theological discourse almost always includes both an articulation
of principles and a consideration of how the principles apply in belief
and conduct. The extension of principle into practice reflects more
than the psychological need of people to understand how a teaching
affects them. It is also, as Charles Sanders Peirce argued, a cogmtive
universal. Peirce explained that every idea that comes before the mind
does so in one of three forms: as feeling, potential, or possibility
(Peirce called these ideas of Firstness); as embodiment, physical
instantiation, or application (ideas, in Pence's vocabulary, of Secondness); or as law or symbol ^deas of Thirdness).*' Even to understand
an abstract concept completely or, in Pence's terms, to make our ideas
clear, the mind must engage the concept in both its abstract and
applied modes. We must "consider what effects, which might conceiv
ably have practical bearings, we conceive the object to have." Peirce
considers it impossible "that we should have an idea in our minds
which relates to anything but conceived sensible effects, and if we
fancy that we have any other we deceive ourselves."" Our current use
of the term embodiedknovAt^gc reflects Pence's emphasis on "sensible
'Although several studiesof early Christian doctrine I have consulted do not self-consciously
draw attention to the gradual accrual of meaning of the term doctrine,they make clear that the
formation of doctrine was a dynamic process that unfolded in tandem with other processes
such as fixing the canon and setting parameters of institutional identity and practice.
Examples of these studies areJ. N. EX Kelly, Earlf Christian Doctrines, 5* ed. revised (London:
Charles Black, 1977) and Aloys Grillmeier, S.J., Christ in Christian Tradition, 2™* ed. (Atlanta:
John Knox Press,1975).
References to the ttiadic nature of human understanding appear throughout Peirce's
writings. Several important explanations are in "What Isa Sign?" "The Categories Defended,"
"The Seven Systems of Metaphysics," and "Nomenclatureand Divisions of Ttiadic Relations,
as Far as They Are Determined," in TheEssentiaiPeirce: SelectedPhilosophicaiWritings, ed. Nathan
Hotiser and Chrisdan Kloesel, 2 vols. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,1992,1998).
" Peirce, "How to Make Our Ideas Qeat," The EssentialPeirce, 1:132.
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effects" and applications. A doctrine is not fully expressed and indeed
cannot be fully comprehended until we attempt to explain how it is
experienced or exemplified. In fact, no matter how far an individual or
institution stresses feeling or attitude over application and activity,
traces of practical application will remain, and no matter how far one
stresses activity or application over feeling or principle, traces of
attitude and principle will always reintroduce themselves into discus
sions of right action.
Bunyan recognixed these issues either openly or tacitly. In The
PiJgrim'sPro£ressthe term doctrinedoes not appear, while it is used several
times in The Second Part of The Pilffim's Progress (hereafter. Part Two).
There, and frequently in his other writings, Bunyan uses the term
doctrine to refer to a true principle, law, or statement of God's nature or
his plan for humanity. And he distinguishes this type of doctrine from
practice. In The Life and Death of Mr. Badman (1680), he refers to
"wolves both as to Doctrine, and as to Practice"; he also contrasts
"doctrine" and "a godly and holy example."'^ The Pilgrim's Progress is
about doctrine as well as practice, and in it Bunyan seems set on
maintaining that in different circumstances they are either quite distinct
or quite inseparable. In Christian's experience, doctrine and behavior
fuse into one. Believing and coming to Christ are, he learns, one and
the same. As Campbell observed of Christian, "As Christian's
experience changes, so does the theology by which he lives.""
Many characters, by their nature and conduct, define a doctrinal
viewpoint. The arrival of Ignorance near the Celestial City and his
subsequent fate illustrate how doctrine and practice overlap. Ignorance
instantiates a certain comfortable,optimistic, untroubled Idnd of belief.
He is the manifestation of a given possibility (Peirce's firsmess) that
some people may well slip into heaven without undergoing the
chastening and soul-strengthening experiences of a Christian or a
Faithful. Ignorance, the character, is also a manifestation of secondness, an embodiment of those possibilities in a person who talks and
acts in a certain way. Christian and Hopeful, recognizing a breach of
some kind of law (thirdness), warn that he is in for trouble and explain

John Bunyan, The Life and Death of Mr. Badman (1680), ed. James R Forrest and Roger
Shatrock (Oxford; Clarendon Press, 1988), 10,78.
" Campbell, "Theology of The Pilffim's Progressf 256.
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•why such a person can't enter •with them. However, what is the set of
laws that governs his exclusion? The figural manifestation of a law
both evokes that law and alters our perception of it. Ignorance may
have his faith wrong, but so may children. If God's decree predestines
whom he •will to salvation, an ignorant person may have all that is
needed to be among the elect, and no human •wisdom can tell the
difference between an elect and a non-elect person. The episode is a
tactical allegory with limited objectives. The specific character
embedded in a particular situation promises to illustrate the practical
implications of a teaching, but the teaching itself is not so easy to infer
from the concrete particulars. Ignorance does not have a Roll, and this
may clarify why he is not admitted to the Celestial City. However, the
clarity begins to disappear once the reader asks how to implement in
life the learning embodied there: how is it possible to formulate a law
or infer an application in the reality of the reader's life? Only in the
carefully designed and controlled world of The Vilgim's Progress can
characters make such sharp judgments of each other. What is a reader
to do in transferring this knowledge to life? If being like Christian
entails making clear judgments of other people, then we reach an
impasse. The text cannot authorize readers to make such judgments of
others. If one's own status as elect or reprobate is an open question
during life, the status of others can in no way be confidendy discerned
either.
In spite of Bunyan's overt usage of the term doctrine. The Pilgrim's
Progress treats doctrine in all three ways we have discussed. It is difficult
to think of such things •without doing so in terms of whait Peirce called
firstness, secondness, and thirdness. All three aspects are necessary to
a whole understanding. Christian's opening question is "What shall I
do to be saved?" (PP, 9). While this may be regarded as the question of
a man who is not in a state of grace, and while it has been argued that
Christian, in fact, does very little in his journey," it certainly can be said
that in encountering situations that face believers generally, he keeps
going. He progresses in accumulated experience and psychological
preparedness until he arrives at his destination. He encounters the
Slough of Despond, enters the •wicket gate in spite of threats from
spiritual adversaries, climbs the Hill Difficulty, fights the dragon

"Stanley Fish,

(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), 224-64.
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ApoUyon, backtxacks •with great effort from the By-Path-Meadow to
return to the way, endures the Giant Despair, and crosses the River of
Death, all the while learning to interpret his o-wn experience. And these
are not just internal states. Dialogue reinforces the concept that
internal states alone are insufficient. In the dialogue between Faithful
and Talkative, Bunyan usesJames 1:27 and1 Corinthians 13:1 to reveal
Talkative's seductive error. Bunyan's belief that "the Soul of Religion
is the practick part" (PP, 65) is bluntly stated and then followed by
scriptural backing:
Pure Peli^on and undated, brfore God and the Father, isthis, to visit
the Fatherkss and Widows in their eviction, and to keep himse^^
unspotted from the World. This Talkative is not aware of, he
thinks that hearing and se^ng\M. make a good Christian and
thus he deceiveth his own Soul. Hearing is but as the so-wing
of the Seed; talking is not sufficient to prove that fruit is
indeed in the heart and life; and let us assure ourselves, that
at the day of Doom, men shall be judged according to their
fruits. It will not be said then, "Didjou believe?^ but "Were
you doers, or talkers only?" and accordingly shall they be
judged. (PP, 65-66)
Doctrine and moral teaching are entwined in a way that valorizes both
conduct and inner attitudes in a dynamic relationship. Works are
valuable not for themselves, but because they prove that the "fruits"
are in both heart and life. Yet people shall be judged by their fruits,
which are equated both with the Word lodging in the heart and -with
bring a "doer."
The unfolding nature of doctrinal understanding and its relative
importance also emerge in The Pilgrim's Proff'ess. Christian's experience
illustrates that a full understanding of doctrine is not always necessary,
and may not be possible. Bunyan teaches that God's grace -will attend
the good Christian through earthly struggles, but even the good
Christian does not always need a clear understanding of doctrine and
of its experiential implications. As Christian goes through the Valley of
the Shadow of Death, he hears a voice proclaiming Psahn 23: "Though
I walk through the rally of the shadow of death, I will fear none ill, for thou art
mth me!' Christian's act of mental self-encouragement that follows the
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scriptural utteranceis relevant to this relation between doctrine and the
clouded understanding that must guide conduct in this life: "Then was
[Christian] glad...for he perceived God was with them, though in that
dark and dismal state; and why not, thought he, with me? though by
reason of the impediment that attends this place I cannot perceive it"
(53). A finite and limited comprehension may not allow us to see
clearly how truth connects with human attitudes and perception, but
faith makes the connection sufficient for divine purposes. What
matters in the journey is not the full grasp of the divine, but the
incomplete grasp of those aspects of truth that are sufficient to the
situation at hand Christian succeeds because he frequendy examines
himself, and as he does so he brings his partial comprehension to bear
and wisely applies a degree of known truth to his current struggle.
Doctrinal understanding is relative to person and situation.

¥ II ¥
We have tried to show that separating doctrine from application or
narrative is not as easy as we may think. We would now like to consider
some specific doctrines to show that they contain features or complica
tions that make representation difficult. These complications affect
how the doctrines might be represented. Galen Johnson has argued
that a knowledge of Bunyan's theology is more vital to interpretation
than the theory or ideology critics adopt in approaching his texts." We
agree that a knowledge of Bunyan's theology can guide interpretation;
however, we point out that even armed with such knowledge, critics
still arrive at divergent interpretations of the allegory. Such a knowl
edge has not produced consensus. We need to go a step further to
understand the difficulties inherent in particular doctrines and
anticipate how these challenge their fictional representation.
Consider Campbell's statement; "Bunyan's imaginative depiction
of Christian's experience is at odds with Bunyan's theoretical views on
the subject.""
of this assertion, our options are to conclude

" Galen Jonson, "*B®
Extream': The Lunits of Theory in Reading John Bunyan,"
ChrMaJtf
(2000): 447-64.
" Campbell, "TheTheology of The Pilgrim's Progress," 256,
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that Bunyan was somehow forgetful, uninformed, or inconsistent; or
to delve into the doctrines and discover a more complex reality that
links the allegory and the theology. Regarding the first option—that
Bunyan was forgetful or uninformed—Gordon Rupp warns us not to
"underestimate the theological competence of the average seventeenthcentury Baptist. It is more than likely that one of them could wipe the
floor with a modern Nonconformist cong regation in theological
debate." Although Baptists generally had low social status and lacked
formal education, "it was among such people that the towering genius
of John Bunyan was earthed, and he was bone of their bone and flesh
of their flesh, not only in his religion and his knowledge of the English
Bible, but also in his awareness of common, everyday life.""
The second option is to discover a more complex reality in
Bunyan's beliefs. A particular teaching such as baptism illustrates how
important it is that we comprehend the uncertainties inherent in the
doctrine before looking for ways in which the story manifests or
applies it. Here we might agree with Campbell when he asserts that
readers look in vain for allusions to such rituals because "the allegorical
depiction of ordinances that are themselves shadowish and figurative
is not conducive to precise interpretation."*® Campbell identifies a
problem here, but we must remember that Bunyan had little difficulty
in depicting other teachings that are figurative. Instead of concluding
with Campbell that "Bunyan's doctrine has not been transported intact
into the imaginative work,"*' we should first investigate the problem
atic status and meaning of such central rituals as baptism, and
communion and then reflect on how such doctrinal positions would
appear in an allegory. We will then see that the difficulty existed not in
Bunyan's inability but in the nuances of his beUef system. Only then are
we able to perceive that his doctrine has been transported into the text
with all its complications.
The place of baptism in Bunyan's belief system was not as fixed
nor as central as the name "Baptist" or many summaries of Baptist
doctrine imply. While the Catholic and Anglican confessions emphasixed the efficacy of both behavioral and ritual "works" (in which

" Gordon Rupp, "RiBgon in England 1688-1791 (Oxford; Clarendon Press, 1986), 137.
" Campbell, "The Theology of The Pilgrim's Pngress," 252-53.
"Campbell, 253.
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ordinances such as baptism and communion play an indispensable role
ioxjustifying a person before God), Bunyan held a more ambivalent
attitude toward ritual ordinances. Although many refer to Bunyan and
his congregation as Baptist, Bunyan wrote of baptism as "shadowish"
and "figurative" and of rituals in general as "helps to our faith...but
not the fundamentals of Christianity, nor grounds or rules to commu
nion with other Christians."^ Not surprisingly, he ministered to an
"open" church at Bedford in which non-Baptists could participate in
the Baptist communion. Of baptism's role in Bunyan's theology,
Gordon Rupp writes: "Nor was it always clear how Baptism was
related to membership, since some congregations, like many Independ
ents, came into existence on the basis of an explicit covenant and
demanded of the individual a profession of faith and Christian
experience."^^ When we look for symbols of baptism or narrative
events that convey its absolute necessity in the believer's life, we look
for a view that Bunyan did not hold. In The Pilgrim's Progress, baptism's
role is depicted in the same ambiguous way. Indeed, in Christian's
spiritual journey, baptism and other similar rites are significant in their
absence. If there is any hint of a ritual or sacramental view of life in The
Pilgrim's Progress, it occurs in the suggestion that believers must pass
through certain types of experiences—the despair following conver
sion, the lure of legalism, approaching the cross, and finding sudden
relief from the burden, and conquering doubts. These add up to a
sacramental view of a life in which transitional and shaping experiences
are so many rites of passage, and clearly symbolic rituals such as
baptism are not necessary for Christian's spiritual progress.
Bunyan's view of baptism is consistent with his predestination
attitudes. If, in fact, a person is predestined to exaltation or reproba
tion, a mere outward ceremony would have Htde beating on his or her
eternal status. Baptism simply becomes "an optional sign of Church
membership" rather than a necessary part of salvation.^ Immersion
in water becomes, essentially, a metaphor for an inner state of soul, a
state which precedes, rather than proceeds from, the ordinance of
^ John Bunyan, A Conftssion ofMj Faith, And A Reaioii ojny Practice (1672), 64-66; quoted in
Rupp,
in England,133.
" Rupp, Eeiiffon in En^nd,133.
^ Roger Shatrock, explanatory note inJohn Bunyan, The Pilgrim's Progress (London; Penguin
Books, 1987), 292, n. 32.
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baptism. Because Bunyan viewed baptism itself as figurative, it is not
surprising that Christian and Christiana's experiences with baptism
should be figurative as well, The text provides a double reflection of
Bunyan's own beliefs; a tiguration of a figure, or more specifically, a
metaphor (the Bath) for an ordinance ^aptism), which is itself a
metaphor for an inner state of grace. Add to these subtleties that
Bunyan's ideas seem to have changed over time, and we have an
additional complication in reading narrative in terms of belief. The
inclusion in Part Two of the bath (PP, 171), an overt baptismal symbol,
may reflect Bunyan's growing appreciation for the role of rites and
ordinances in his later years.^
The election doctrine poses even more problems of narrative
representation than does baptism. Campbell, it will be remembered,
stated flatly that this teaching does not affect Christian. We maintain
that the difficulty lies less in Bunyan's wish to neglect or downplay it
than in the doctrine itself and its perplexing relation to life and to
narrative. From the beginning, we need to remind ourselves that to
comprehend election is also to grasp how it challenges comprehension.
Orthodox thinkers performed some of their most agile mental
gymnastics when they made the transition from this doctrine to its
implications for behavior. To make that transfer at all is to invoke
concepts of consequences and responsibility where they are initially
denied. Even though elect souls can do nothing to nullify or activate
their election, they live in a world in which they perpetually experience
choosing, experience a range of consequences of each belief and
behavior, and choose from among desirable and undesirable responses
in each thought and act. As Isabel Rivers has summarized, a common
theme in devotional and doctrinal writings is "the problem of balanc
ing the doctrine of grace with practice, of giving due weight to the
latter while not alio wing it to derog ate from the former."^'^ F or
example, the Westminster Confession tried to balance the demands of
" Shartock suggests that Bunyan may have included overt allusions to baptism in Part Tm
when his fellow Baptists complained that references to it were patendy missing in PP
(Shartock, ed., 292, n. 32), but Galen Johnson believes that Bunyan began to view baptism
as more vital in the years after he wrote Differettces in Judgment about Water Bt^tim, No Bar to
Communion
See Prisoner of Conscience, Studies in Evangelical History and Thought
(Carlisle: Paternoster Press, 2003), 153-55.
Isabel Rivers, Piason, Grace, and Sentiment: A Stucb/ of the Language ofBeHgon and Ethics in
England, 1660-1780 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 13.
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election and responsibility by depicting grace as outside hvunan
influence and the source of all good, but it also conveyed that "any
interpretation of the doctrine of grace that slights human action or
frees the regenerate from the obligations of the moral law is also
fundamentally wrong."^ One common method of placing responsibil
ity on the believer was to view pious conduct and charitable works as
evidence of election rather than the cause of it. Yet the paradox placed
extreme demands on the believer. Bayly's Practice of Piety assures the
devout: "If therefore on thy calling thou conformest thy selfe to the
Word and example of Christ thy master, and obeyest the good motions
of the holy Spirit, in leaving sin, and living a goodly life: then assure
thyself that thou art one of those, who are infalliblji predestined to
everlasting salvation."^ Notice the heavy conditional jfhere joined with
the assurance expressed in "infallibly."
Bunyan struggled with the conflicts between unalterable destiny
and his experience of it in daily action and attitude. In Grace Abounding
Satan whispers to Bunyan that if he is not elect, he "had as good leave
off, and strive no further; for if indeed you should not be Elected and
chosen of God, there is no talke of your being saved: For it is neither in
him that willeth, nor in him that runneth, but in God that showeth merty"
Bunyan later hears a voice that assures him, "Look at the generations ofold,
and see, did ever any trustin God and were confounded. This thought helped
Bunyan adjust both his attitudes and his conduct, over which he had
a good measure of responsibility, even if neither attitude nor conduct
completely determined his election. That faith also prompted Bunyan's
own leap: "Wherefore, thought I...1 am for going on, and venturing
my eternal state with Christ, whether I have comfort here or no; if God
doth not come in, thought I, I wiQ leap off the Ladder even blindfold
into Eternitie, sink or swim, come heaven, come hell; Lord Jesus, if
thou wilt catch me, do; if not, I will venture for thy Name."^
There are, in a sense, two discourses of predestination. One
invites the wicked to accept the offer of grace and salvation, and
another admonishes those, like Christian, who want to be encouraged
®Rtveis,15.

" LewisBayly.TArPnKrfw^P/f^ (1643),149.
"John Bunyan, Grace Abounding to the Cbirf of Sinners, ed. Roger Sharrodc (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1962), 21.
" Bunyan, Grace Abounding,101.
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and assured of their divine election but who may need chastening.
Both discourses are fraught with tensionsamong freedom, responsibil
ity, and grace; both create their own rhetorical problems. In addressing
the wicked, devotional writers usually adopted a comforting tone and
encouraged them to follow good spiritual impulses. 'Reprobation Asserted
avows that "Reprobation Wndreth no man from seeldng the Salvation
of his soul" and that
God ^veth to divers of the Reprobates great incouragement
thereto; to wit. Tenders of the Gospel in general, not
excluding any; great light also to understand it, with many a
sweet taste of the good Word of God, and the Powers of the
World to come... All of which, without doubt, both are and
ought to be great incouragements even to the Reprobates
themselves, to seek the Salvation of their Souls.^
Bunyan views the promptings of the spirit as promises of redemption.
Anyone who feels his or her "heart moving after Jesus Christ" can be
assured that such feelings would not exist "if it were not ^ven by
promise, and drawing to Christ by the power of the Father."'" He also
assured fellow believers who wondered about their own election:
"Jesus Christ hath promised. That him that cometh to him he will in
no wise cast out."'" In Good Nem for the Vilest of Men, an imagined
auditor objects, "But I am a reprobate," to which Bunyan answers,
"Now thou talkest like a fool, and medlest with what thou xinderstandest not: No sin, but the sin of final Impenitence, can prove a Man a
Reprobate."" Doubts fanned by Satan should be countered, he
advised, by saying, "I am coming to such a Lord Jesus, as will in no

^ R/^robalioH Asserted: Or, TbeDoclrine ofEtemal Ekction and Reprobation Promisaiomfy Handled
(London, 1674), 23. Editors disagree about whether Bunyan wrote this text, but as the
surrounding material illustrates, it is compatible with his treatment of election and
reprobation.
*|)ohn Bunyan, Come, Welcome, to Jesus Christ, ed. Richard L. Greaves, in The Miscellaneous
Works ofJohn Bniffan,13 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), 8:352.
"Bunyan, Come, &Welcome, 352.
^Jd\ia'Qwcpxi,GoodNewsforthe Vilest of Men, Or, A Help for Despairing Souls, ed. Richard L.
Greaves, in The Miscellaneous Worksof John Btttffau,13 vols. (Oxford: Qatendon Press, 1985),
11:57.
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wise cast me out."" Implicit in the invitation to the wicked is a premise
that here and now they can influence their eternal state.
A narrative that embraces the whole of the election doctrine, with
its simultaneous denial and assertion of the part that human souls on
earth play in affecting their eternal salvation, would have to depict both
aspects. The Pi/grim's Progress does both,and thus it can support readings
in support of both predestination and human agency in affecting
salvation. For example, at the cross Christian receives his Roll, his
'Tass into the Celestial City" (PP, 36), which seems to symbolize that
his name has been entered in the book of life, but he then carelessly
loses the Roll and then strenuously exerts himself to rediscover it.
Having received the Roll is not enough; he must maintain it. This
episode is typical of the multifaceted ways in which the narrative
conveys the play between an ultimate, unalterable election or reproba
tion on the one hand and, on the other, the psychological and
attitudinal adjustments that finite human souls make when they
embrace that doctrine. If The Pilgrim's Progress exhibits a lack of clarity
or multiple viewpoints on the doctrine of election, it is just what we
should expect from a close acquaintance with the doctrine itself.
The difficulties inherent in the predestination doctrine are
compounded by normal narrative structure. Narrative generally implies
responsibility for, and consequences of, actions. Consulting another
type of deterministic writing will clarify the point. Thomas Hardy's
greatest challenge in his novels was to invent ways to represent de
terminism in individual lives wherein responsibility, and consequence
were also undeniable. Yes, it is possible to read Jude the Obscure as a
demonstration of an indifferent or even malevolent determinism, but
it is just as possible to interpret it, as many readers do, another way.
Even granting that its characters confront severe constraints of class,
education, poverty, and social prejudice, those characters have freedom
and choice in many areas, and in those areas, consequences rule with
a terrible log^c. Such consequences are the rule in narrative. Conflicts
and resolutions are narratively effective when a character's fate is in
question. When no fate is in question, readers usually experience little
suspense and have less sympathy for the characters. Bunyan's genius
appears in his ability to sustain strands of individual accountability and
" Bunyan, Come, &Welcome, 352.
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predestination simultaneously. Readers can find the allegory's driving
motive or interest in Christian's varying sense of being simultaneously
justified and sinner. Thus, the very elements of good narrative prove
bad doctrine for Bunyan: conflicts are not true conflicts unless their
outcome is uncertain, and in a predestined world their outcome is
uncertain only to the characters, who have in turn been created to
serve narrative purposes.
What would a narrative be like that fuUy adopted the doctrine of
election? There are several options. In the case of a text that endorses
the election doctrine and that features a character who believes in his
or her election, the narrative tensions would focus on the character's
struggle to behave as one should and bring glory to God, given the
assurance of grace and the temptations of the world. This we find in
many spiritual autobiographies. In the case of a text that does not
accept election as a true doctrine and that features a main character
who believes in his or her election, the narrative may well ridicule the
effects of such a belief, including possible rationalixations of bad
conduct, on the character. James Hogg takes this tack in The Private
Memoirs and Confessions ofaJustified Sinner (1824), which begins, interest
ingly, in Bunyan's time with the marriage of a stern, predestinarian
woman to a lively Scottish laird. Their son becomes convinced that he
is elect and concludes that he can revel in sinful pleasures without
regard to their eternal consequences. In a narrative of a character who
desires election but is not assured of it, the inner tensions may be more
pronounced. Characters would face a struggle to.obtain and believe in
their election and would be constantly scrutinixing their conduct and
feelings in order to find evidence of it Good behavior, victory over
opposition and discouragement, and a strong desire to conform to
God's commands become the signs that partially convince the subject
of his or her election, but uncertainty can remain. This pattern is also
evident in spiritual autobiographies, including Bunyan's own. And the
pattern is evident in The Pil^m's Process. Consequentiy, if Bunyan is
trying to persuade the world to adopt a predestinarian point of view,
the genre he chooses works both for and against him. The great appeal
of The Pilgrim's Progress to readers of neady all Christian persuasions
attests to the seeming submersion of election in a narrative of
responsibility. It may be impossible to resolve the paradoxes involved.
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The difficulty of separating doctrine from application and the inherent
tensions in particular doctrines create hermeneutical challenges for
readers who want to connect doctrine and narrative in The Pilgim's
Progress. A culminating challenge derives from the fact that the complex
doctrine that we call election is already narrative in nature. Narrative
theorist Walter Fisher claims that human beings arc born with an
awareness of "what constitutes a coherent story" and that they have
the natural ability to test stories, or as Fisher says, to test "narrative
fidelity," by contrasting the stories they hear with stories that they
know to be true.''* The challenges of interpreting The Pilffim's Process
according to its teachings spring in part, we suggest, from the fact that
one of its primary doctrines is itself narrative in nature, thus yielding us
a story of a story that tests the limits of narrative fidelity.
In its Peircean modes, election appears in its firstness aspect as the
potential that a soul, even prior to living in mortality, can be unalter
ably destined to eternal salvation or damnation in spite of any choices
that soul will make once it has the opportunity to live and make
choices. Its secondness is the experience of life in a state where choice
and accountability, responsibility and consequences are evident, but
where the understanding is finite and clouded. Its aspect of thirdness
is the law upon which God decrees the eternal destiny of a soul and
can do so in justice. These become a narrative, from a state of
possibility before this life, through a life embodied and experieiiced
with finite comprehension, to a state after death, where the soul will
meet its eternal destiny and wiU presumably grasp the justice of God
but wiE find that comprehension of no avail to change the outcome.
Perceived from the human point of view, predestination, at least for
those who learn of it, forces believers, obviously in the second stage of
their existence, to take into account the possibility of a stage of prior
existence during which they were decreed to have a given destiny when
they reach the third stage.

" Walter Fisher, "Narration as a Human Communication Paradigm," in Contemporary
UttoricalTheoty, ed.John Louis Lucaites, Celeste Michelle Condit, and Sally CaudiU (New
York: Guilford Press, 1999), 272.
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Election is therefore literary-like; it is already a storywith a setting,
a set of characters, and a plot. From the author's or God's point of
view, it is deternained from the start, but, from the character-like,
human point of view, the outcome is uncertain. A definition of
predestination will usually unfold as a story. For example, this is one of
Calvin's definitions of predestination:
By predestination we mean the eternal decree of God, by
which he determined with himself whatever he wished to
happen with regard to every man. All are not created on
equal terms, but some are preordained to eternal life, others
to eternal damnation; and, accordingly, as each has been
created for one or other of these ends, we say that he has
been predestinated to life or to death.''
We notice that the definition is a narrative.' It even displays the
elements of story that any rudimentary narratology will predict. For
example, William LaboVs simple enumeration of the elements of story
predicts the following elements:
1. Abstract: a framing comment or summary
2. Orientation: time frame, location, persons involved, the
activity or situation
3. Complicating action
4. Evaluation: something indicating the point of the narra
tive, including reflection on the meaning
5. Result or resolution
6. Coda: closes off the narrative.'®
The abstract and coda are often considered optional devices that frame
the essential parts. These elements appear in nearly any explanation of
predestination. In reference to Calvin's definition above, the abstract
is the phrase "by predestination we mean... ," indicating that a
definition is to follow. We see the orientation in the time frame before
''John Calvin, Institutes ofthe Christian 'Rtii^n, trans. Henry Beveridge, 2 vols. (Grand Rapids:
W. B. Eerdmans, 1957), 2:206.
" William Labov, Language inthe Inner City: Studies in the Black English Vernacular (Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1972), 363-70.
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humans were placed on earth, the persons involved—God and his
creatures— and the situation in which God acts to create and assign a
destiny to his creatures. The complicating factor is that human beings,
as God makes them, differ in some quality of their souls that correlates
to their fate. The result or resolution is twofold: first, their being
consigned to a fate that accords with the quality of their souls and,
second, their being placed on earth toexperience life in relative degrees
of ignorance or knowledge of God's will and power, with the accom
panying duty to leam of these. The evaluation component does not
appear in the definition-as-narrative, but Calvin devotes much of his
effort in his writings on predestination to what Labov calls evaluation,
or what humans are expected to do with this knowledge. Indeed,
information on the other narrative elements is usually so sparse that
evaluation expands to fill the information void. Thus, discourse on
predestination produces a story to explain a story.
The fact that there are really two predestination stories makes the
doctrine of predestination and election more complicated. There is
predestination from the point of view of God, but there is a subordi
nate or derivative story also, and that is the story of each soul that
sojourns on earth. As Calvin observed.
Although it is now sufficiently plain that God by his secret
counsel chooses whom he will while he rejects others, his
gratuitous election has only been partially explained until we
come to the case of single individuals, to whom God not
only offers salvation, but so assigns it, that the certainty of
the result remains not dubious or suspended."
The derivative story—derivative because it derives from the larger
narrative, and because the agents in this story have no power to affect
the outcome—also has almost all the basic elements of narrative, but
in this case a new complication is added: humans are born ignorant and
have to discover over time a destiny that, try as they may, is not nearly
certain. The individual is torn between two states, of certainty and
uncertainty, and that tension leads to the inner searching so evident in
Bunyan's own conversion narrative, Grace Aborning.
" Calvin, InsHtnta, Z209.
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The narrative of God's predestinating all human souls, then, is
rendered more perplexing by the need of human beings to compre
hend. For believers, this need is fraught with further difficulty. As
even Calvin observed, "But if it is plainly owing to the mere pleasure
of God that salvation is spontaneously offered to some, while others
have no access to it, great and difficult questions immediately arise,
questions which are inexplicable, when just views are not entertained
concerning election and predestination."^® He warned that the
"unrestrained imagination" makes this quest "perilous, and even
fatal."®' In these passages, Calvin himself engages in the two levels of
narrative, of God's act upon humanity and of humanity's response to
the knowledge of God's actions. The doctrine produces narrative
because it is already a story; being difficult to grasp,it requires
consideration from various perspectives. Once grasped, it ihunediately
gives rise to consideration of its effects on those who must live out its
implications. Indeed, to some extent the doctrine of election can only
be narratively conceived as a series of events and their effects on two
character sets.
The Pilgnm's Process iackiid&s both primary and derivative stories,
but it is told primarily from the perspective of the derivative, which
story then serves as a means of exemplifying the primary or master
story. So we have a story being interpreted through a story, and since
the complications of the derivative story include ignorance and human
frailty, exemplifying the predestination story through the derivative
human story is bound to create differences of perspective. The focus
shifts back and forth as Christian and his human companions try to
live in accordance with infinite and divine perspectives. For example,
the episode of By-Path-Meadow, interpreted in light of divine
predestination, illustrates that Vain-confidence was destined to be
dashed in pieces all along. But from the human perspective, what is
Vain-confidence to do? Our answer depends on the vantage point
from which we read his story. From the higher perspective, what he
can do is nothing. He is a creature who seeks to draw nearer to the
Celestial City but who is destined by his attitudes to stumble into a pit
he cannot see and to die on the rocks. By contrast, Christian and

™ Calvin, 2:20Z
''Calvin, 2:204.
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Hopeful have the advantage of Vain-confidence's death as a warning,
and they are therefore able to reflect on their had choice of path and
turn back. The shift from the short episode of Vain-confidence to
Christian and Hopeful is also a shift from the austere divine story to
the focalization of humans who are forced to make decisions in light
of limited knowledge. Christian and Hopeful must act as if their
salvation depends on each choice they make. Their choice to take the
by-path, the recognition that they might themselves have fallen into the
pit had not Vain-confidence been in the lead, the decision to return to
the Way by retracing their route along the by-path, the arduous labor
they put into returning, and the rest they take within the borders of
Doubting Castle are all decisions made with the assumption that their
final destination depends upon their actions.
The Pilgrim's Progress is therefore a necessary complement to the
doctrines of predestination and election and to the endless discourse
of how to know whether one is elect and how to act in this life.
Election forces people to view life as a text governed by different
orders of laws, accessible through different levels of knowledge, and
liable to different interpretations according to the levels of law and
knowledge we bring to it. That being so, literature in turn provides the
best model for understanding the dynamics of election and predestina
tion. From the first page of The Pilgrim's Prog-ess, the ending is already
determined, yet readers encounter each episode as a discovery, and
they experience each accomplished choice, intervention, and turn of
events as only one of several possible outcomes. Those who re-read it
already know which characters arrive at the Celestial City. They can
read it again, still observing the uncertainty of the characters and
experiencing some of the anxieties about outcomes, decisions, and
character growth. The events, resolutions, dilemmas—everything is
ultimately determined even before the reader begins to read, yet
everything is undetermined from the point of view of characters within
the narrative and readers who immerse themselves in the morally
loaded world. From the standpoint of the author and the readers, then,
the text is very much predetermined—just as life is purportedly
predetermined by an all-knowing God. However—as in lived
experience—the characters themselves do not know the end from the
heg^ning. They cannot look to the end of the hook and see who is
saved, who is damned.

Doctrine to Narrative

309

The characters have different experiences of election according to
their knowledge of and commitment to what they perceive as true
teaching. As N. H. Keeble says in his introduction to the Oxford
edition of The Pilgrim's Progress, "this dogma [of election] is not
confidendy applied to themselves by those whose self-evident
weaknesses givegrounds for doubting their election.'"*" Christian, who
goes astray on his journey and must be rescued by external intervention
again and again, has much reason to doubt his own election. No
matter what Christian believes about himself, however, his fate is
sealed long before we are introduced to him by the author's purpose
to bring him to the Celestial City. The characters are required to do the
best they can in order to arrive at the end of their journey, happy and
satisfied with their lot. In fact, a perhaps inadvertent feature of
Bunyan's design is that characters who are traveling seem to be
overwhelmingly among the elect. "Hence, what marks out Bunyan's
pilgrims is less any remarkable degree of grace than that they keep
going," remarks Keeble."** While Bunyan stations a number of helpers
along the way to provide the travelers with divine counsel and
direction, such helpers appear to have already made it to the Celestial
City, while those destined for election are those who risk the hazards
of the road, the possible dangers of travel through unknown regions,
and the challenge of finding one's way when one knows only a type of
destination, not its precise location or nature, much less every route
and junction. By contrast, the occupants of towns like Morality and
Vanity Fair stay put.
Smart Sim illuminates a relevant puzzle in the cross-over between
doctrine and behavior. Sim argues that a central paradox of Calvinism,
one that appears in The Pilgrim's Prognss, is that "the elect can take no
credit for their own conversion," while "the reprobate must carry the
blame for their own damnation.'"*^ Insofar as the elect are concerned,
the doctrine of election is perceived to manifest itself primarily in
firstness (feeling, possibility) and thirdness (the law that governs
election), while in relation to the reprobate, Bunyan's handling implies
N. H. Keeble, "Introduction," to John Bunyan, Tit
Prognss, ed. N. H. Keeble
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), xix.
•" N. H. Keeble, "The Way and the Ways of Puritan Story: Biblical Patterns in Bunyan and
his Contemporaries," Eng/ish:Journal of the Engfsh Association 33 (Autumn 1984): 219.
Sim, NegotiatioHs trith Paradox, 53.
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secondness (embodied action that brings consequences). An aspect of
secondness appears even among the elect; however, it is immediately
swallowed up in thirdness. Election is offered to those who are willing
to submit to God's prevenient determination: "If we be truly willing to
have it, he wiU bestow it upon us freely" (PP, 12). In another way, for
the elect, predestination and election manifest themselves in a
secondness that has, as Sim observes, unintended consequences. The
paradoxes of election lead to individuation because introspection and
constant personal negotiation with the paradoxes help define one's
individual identity—^an individuation that is in some ways at odds with
the swallowing of individual Avill in submission to divine destmy."*^ The
fact that Bunyan manipulates the inherent tensions in the election
doctrine in favor of the elect creates an opening in which the three
aspects of the doctrine appear more clearly in their dynamic interplay.
The human dynamics of predestination, then, are reflected in the
play among authorial knowledge, character indeterminacy, and reader
desire and anticipation. Literary creations, deterministic or not, may
present the best analogy to predestination. The author/reader split may
not translate neatly into life and the application of predestination. Nor
is the analogy between a character's and a reader's knowledge com
plete. However skillful an author is in creating believable characters
who seem to be real people, they are not like their embodied readers
who live and die. Characters live only as effects of signs in the minds
of readers, but readers put books down and go about their lives. Nor
is the author directly analogous to the God that would be responsible
to destine living souls to salvation or damnation. The literary analogy
of predestination can take us only so far, but the parallels are informa
tive nonetheless. The narrative structure both counteracts and
corroborates the doctrine of predestination in Bunyan's theology and
creative works.

¥ rv *
Our study has tried to offer a recognition that highly informed yet
divergent readings of The Pilgrim's Progress wiU continue to occur
« Sim, 182.
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because of the complicated entanglements of doctrine in narrative. We
started the essay with an image of Christian being given two opportuni
ties to see the terrain ahead from a higher point of view. These vistas
afforded him perspective on his journey and motivated him to
proceed, but they did not release him from having to overcome the
trials he had to face, whether they were brought on by himself or
others. Similarly, the reader of The Pilffim's Progress faces numerous
challenges in interpreting its incidents in terms of the more general
doctrines that Bunyan seems intent on teaching. The challenges of
connecting doctrine and narrative, challenges that have enabled
scholars to differ so widely in their interpretations, spring from several
sources: from a distinction between doctrine and narrative that doesn't
hold up generally, from the complications inherent in particular
doctrines which make them less stable than they might appear, and
from the narrative nature of predestination and election, which requires
that a fictional representation be a story of a story with competing
points of view. The journey motif is apt. Christian journeys toward a
Celestial City, and readers proceed through a complicated series of
inferences and feelings that culminate in greater clarity than any single
episode can give us. However, their arrival presents something of an
enigma: Christian arrives at the Celestial City in every reading, but
because of the factors we have considered in this essay, critics and
scholars will keep arriving at different meaning-destinations.'*^
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of th« ess^, Cdm M. Peterson, is a pen-name representing a syndicate of authors compns^ of David Paxman, Josi Brewer, AUsa Bolander. Naomi Frandsen, Peter Gardner,
RaAel Mackay, and Kerry Lynri Spencer. The authors would alsolike to offers special thanks
to C^en Johnson, whose questions and generous suggestions were so helpfhl as we prepared
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